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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PEARL McCONKIE PERRY,

Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
J. ARCHIE McCONKIE and
WILLIAM H. McCONKIE,

Case No.
781'
1/

Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants' Brief
Preliminary Statement

This action was brought by Plaintiff, Pearl Mcconkie Perry, against the Defendants, her two brothers, to have them adjudged trustees of the lands described in her complaint, for the heirs of the estate of
Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, and to require them
to account for the income and proceeds derived therefrom. She is the only dissatisfied heir of Virtus McConkie, and bases her claim upon the theory that the
title to the lands in question was in the name of and
belonged to Virtus F. McConkie at the time of his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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death, but were not inventoried or included in his
estate in the probate thereof; and that certain assignIuents transferring and assigning the equity in these
lands to Virtus McConkie had been altered by reInoval of the name of Virtus F. McConkie, and insertion of the name of J. Archie McConkie. one of the
defendants.
Defendants' theory was that J. Archie McConkie
\Yas the sole owner of the property by virtue of
patents from the State of Utah; that the father hadn't
any interest therein; that any interest plaintiff may
have had under her father's estate, assuming such an
interest, passed to her mother by virtue of an assignment to the mother and a Decree of Distribution in
the Estate, which distributed all the particularly described property and also all other undescribed and
unknown property of the estate, to her mother. Defendants also raised the question of the Statute of
Limitations; that this was a collateral attack which
could not be properly made against the decree, and
raised the question of whether the plaintiff was not
suing the wrong parties.
From a decision of the trial court that defendants hold the property in trust for the heirs of Virtus
F. McConkie, deceased, and that these heirs are entitled to an accounting, the defendants have appealed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Statement of Facts
Virtus F. McConkie died February 20, 1920 at
Maeser, Uintah County, Utah. His widow, Caroline
E. McConkie \Yas appointed administratrix and proceeded to administer the estate. She filed the requisite inventory and appraisement, but did not include
in the inventory the property now in dispute, which
is described frequently in the record as the LaPoint
property, and will be referred to herein by that designation.
All of the heirs met together in the office of Tom
O'Donnell, an attorney, during the course of the probate, and at that time the rights of all the children
(except Marie who was then under age and who
signed later Tr. 139), assigned all their rights and
interest in the estate to their mother. (Tr. 8, 139).
Thereafter, the estate which had a value of approximately $15,000 was distributed to the mother. (See
probate file, admitted in evidence Tr. 54). The decree of distribution contained an omnibus clause
which distributed to Caroline E. McConkie all prop-·
erty owned by Virtus F. McConkie, whether known
or unknown. (Ex. Probate File).
The two sons, Archie and William, continued
to help the mother operate the property during thE>
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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probate of the estate, and thereafter, and the funds
derived therefrom were used to defray the family
expenses. During a part of this ti1ne at least, the family group living together consisted of the mother,
Marie, Leona, the two sons and the plaintiff and her
four children. (Tr. 117). After the probate of the
estate it was agreed that Archie and William should
have the property upon their payment to each of the
girls the sum of $2,000, and their supporting and
taking care of the mother's financial needs during
her lifetime.
There is considerable evidence that as early as
1927 Pearl agitated for more money for her share in
the LaPoint property, and that the boys, upon recommendation of their mother gave each of the girls an
additional $1,000, and that in fact, Pearl received a
total of $3500. (Tr. 129, 130, 174).
Prior to her death Mrs. Caroline E. McConkie
conveyed the Maeser property to William with the
exception of the house which she conveyed to Marie
who took care of her mother's personal needs during
her declining years. (Tr. 119).
Prior to their father's death, Archie and William
and their father worked the ranch properties as partners, and had done so for many years. This included
the home property at Maeser, and, after its acquisiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion, the property at LaPoint. After their father's
death Archie and William continued to work together, although it appears that they kept the LaPoint property separate from the Maeser property~
which they operated along \Yith their mother.
The plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect
that she at no time prior to 1947 discovered that the
LaPoint property \vas in her father's name, and that
she only made this discovery when information frorr1
an uncle and a third party caused her to investigate.
CTr. 15, 16, 17) This, despite the fact that she lived
next door to her parents with her first husband while
she was married to him, and until she divorced him,
and then went to live with her mother and brothers
and sisters upon her divorce shortly after her father's
death. CTr. 25).
She testified that at the time of the assignment
of their rights to their mother in O'Donnell's office~
that the only discussion as to the LaPoint property
was the statement by the mother, affirmed by the
two boys, to the effect that this property belonged to
the two boys (Tr. 23), and she knew at the time that
the boys were living at the LaPoint property CTr. 23).
For a period of time after her father's death she lived
at the LaPoint property with her brothers CTr. 24,
25), after her divorce from her first husband, and
before she remarried. CTr. 23., 24).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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She could not remember when she found out
about the existence of the LaPoint property, and
didn't know what had been traded for it (Tr. 26, 29,
34). Her statement was: (Tr. 30) ''\Vell I don't know
\vhen-I know that the folks had an interest over
there but I didn't know anything about the deals or
anything about it, and they swore at the time in Tom
O'Donnell's office at the time ·we signed that paper
that 'vas all the interest my dad had." She said that
she thought it was in her dad's name, but they said
no it belonged to the boys. (Tr. 38).
When cross examined with respect to certain
statement made in a deposition wherein she had answered that she knevv her father had turned in cattle
and pasture land on the purchase of the LaPoint land,
she sought to qualify these statements by saying that
she found these things out in 1949 (Tr. 35, 36).
J. Percy Goddard testified as an expert that certain assignments relating to the LaPoint property
and which appear in the record as exhibits A, Band
C, had been altered, in that first names therein had
been removed, and the name J. Archie had been
substituted therein, leaving the last name McConkie
as it was originally. (Tr. 55, 56, 57). He also admitted on cross examination that a similar alteration appeared in one assignment in said exhibits prior to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assignment to lVIcConkie~ (Tr.
tice \Yas not unique.

63)~

so that this prac-

A stipulation was offered by counsel for the defendants that the assignments were changed by J.
Archie McConkie at the request of his father. Exhibit
F. is a paragraph from an answer filed in a previous
suit brought by this same plaintiff, (\vhich case was
dismissed without prejudice) in which J. Archie McConkie alleged that he erased the name of Virtus F.
McConkie and inserted his own name, at the request
of his father Virtus F. McConkie and in the presence
of his father, vVilliam and Caroline E. McConkie.
The plaintiff failed utterly to prove any of the
requisite facts under which she would be entitled to
a recovery. The only testimony she introduced even
remotely bearing on the change in the assignments
was her testimony that she and her attorney asked
Archie and Will if they hadn't erased her dad's name
on the assignments and put in Arch's and they said
yes, and Arch said she couldn't do anything about
it, and Will said they would all stick together (Tr. 10.,
11).
On the other hand, Marie McConkie Johnson,
the only living heir of Virtus F. McConkie, aside
from the litigants, and who had as much to gain as
did the plaintiff by claiming to have not known
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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about the situation with respect to the LaPoint property, testified quite frankly that she did know the
details of the transaction for the LaPoint property.
That 80 acres of land in Ashley vVard and some cows
were traded for it (Tr. 164, 165); that 'Vill and Arch
and their father worked as partners (Tr. 171) and
that at the meeting in O'Donnell's office the LaPoin1
property was discussed as belonging to the boys.
She also testified to several conversations with
Pearl subsequent to her father's death, and up to the
early part of 1946, which indicated that Pearl, during all that period of time was aware of the situation
vvith respect to the LaPoint property, and had been
trying to get her to join in to get a part of the property away from the boys. (Tr. 174, 178, 179). She
also testified to a conversa~ion in 1928 when Pearl
told her that she had got the girls an additional
$1,000 as a share in the LaPoint property (Tr. 174,
176). She also told of a conversation in July 1946, in
which Pearl stated she felt she should get more from
the LaPoint property (Tr. 177) and that she didn't
think she had got her share from her father's estate.
Marie also testified that before her father's
death, she had heard talk at home to the effect that
the LaPoint property had been fixed to Arch, and
that the LaPoint property was in Archie's name
when her father died. (Tr. 168, 184).
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Verdin Johnson, husband of Marie McConkie
Johnson corroborated his vv ife as to the 1946 conversation. (Tr. 190, 191).
\Villiam H. McConkie testified that during his
father's lifetin1e, he, Archie and their father ran
their cattle together and the ranches (Tr. 104). That
the LaPoint property was acquired in April 1918.
(Tr. 104); that the assignments were changed prior
to his father's death. (Tr. 135).
With respect to the meeting in O'Donnell's office when the heirs assigned their rights to the moth. er, he testified that he and his mother had previously
talked to O'Donnell, and that it was O'Donnell's advice that they make such a transfer (Tr. 108, 115).
That they carried this information to the rest of the
family, and that it was agreed upon and thereupon
they went to O'Donnell's office and made the assignment.
He further testified that at the meeting with
O'Donnell the LaPoint property was discussed pro
and con and thrashed out (Tr. 110); that it was fully
discussed before they signed, as belonging to the boys
(Tr. 110, 111, 116); and that the mother went over
with them what property belonged to the estate and
what belonged to the boys (Tr. 116). He also testified that the agreement to pay the girls $2,000 each
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arose after the property had been assigned to the
mother, and came about as a result of the mother
stating she figured each should have $2,000 out of
the estate, and if he and Archie would pay each of
the girls $2,000 and take care of her so long as she
lived, she would give them her property (Tr. 118,
119). He also testified that prior to his mother's
death, she deeded to he and Archie all her property,
including any interest she had in the LaPoint property. (Tr. 119, 120). An objection was sustained to
this answer, but plaintiff made no motion to strike it.
C'fr. 120). Defendant' exhibit 3, a quit claim deed
to the land in LaPoint from the mother to Archie
vYas offered in evidence but an objection to it was
erroneously sustained. (Tr. 121)
William also testified to the payment to Pearl
of her $2,000 and an additional $1500 beyond this
CTr. 123, 124 130), which was paid at the mother's
recommendation (Tr. 129); that this was in January
of 1927 (Tr. 129, 130).
J. Archie McConkie testified that they agreed
to assign all their rights over to their mother prior
to the time that he and William agreed to pay the
girls $2,000 (Tr. 244); that after his father's death
he and Will operated the LaPoint land as partners
(Tr. 247); that they were the only ones who owned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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it, and at the tin1e of his father's death they claimed
it as their n\vn and so stated in O'Donnell's office.
Appellants have outlined the evidence in considerable detail, because they believe that the trial
court erred in finding as he did thereon, and that the
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is insufficient to
sustain the court's findings conclusions and judgment, and that to the contrary, the evidence clearly
supports the defendants' position throughout.

Statement of Points Relied Upon by the Appellant

1. There was no evidence introduced to prove
that Virtus F. McConkie owned the LaPoint property
at the time of his death, nor any other of the essential allegations of Plaintiff's complaint.
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the
following findings of the Court:
A. The evidence is insufficient to support the
part of finding No. 9 wherein the Court found that
"The said property and assignments referred to in
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these findings were owned
and possessed by the said Virtus F. McConkie at the
time of his death.
B. The evidence does not support finding No.
10 that "Subsequent to the making and delivery of
said assignments on April 29, 1918, to Virtus F. McConkie as set forth in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these
findings the defendant J. Archie McConkie falsely
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and fraudulently, and with the intent to defraud the
plaintiff and other heirs at law of the estate of Virtus
F. McConkie, deceased, erased, obliterated and reInoved the name of Virtus F. NicConkie from saiu
vvritten assignments and inserted in the place thereof
his ovvn name, J. Archie McConkie; and also at said
subsequent time erased in the affidavits of citizenship upon said assignments the signature of Virtus F.
lVIcConkie and inserted his own narne in place thereof; that the defendant J. Archie McConkie erased,
obliterated and removed the name of the said Virtus
F. McConkie from said instruments as hereinabove
set forth with the knowledge, acquiescense, consent
and encouragement of the defendant William H. McConkie and upon an understanding and agreement
that the gains to be obtained from aid fraudulent
scheme in thus removing the name of the said Virtus
F. McConkie from said instruments would be shared
by the defendants, J. Archie McConkie and William
H. McConkie."
C. , The evidence does not support that part
of finding No. 11 wherein the court found: "Upon
the death of the said Virtus F. McConkie, the defendants, J. Archie McConkie and William H. McConkie, went into possession of the said real property, and the said defendants stated to the plaintiff
that thev were the owners of said land and that none
of the same constituted any portion of the said estate
of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased; that plaintiff and
other daughters of deceased believed said defendants
in the statements which they thus made and relied
thereon, and said statements were falsely and fraudulently made with the intent to deceive the plaintiff
and the other heirs of the estate of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased; . . ."
D. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the
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Court's finding No. 12, ""That plaintiff, at all times
until on or about the 9th day of April, 1949, believed
that said property belonged to the said defendants,
J. ~-\rchie McConkie and VVilliam H. McConkie; that,
on or about the date last mentioned, plaintiff, for the
first time, learned that the assignments mentioned
in paragraph 6, 7 and 8 of these Findings of Fact had
been forged and altered as hereinabove set forth;
that upon learning such facts plaintiff immediately
made demand upon the defendants, and each of
them, that the estate of Virtus F. McConkie be reopened for probate or that said defendants make satisfactory accounting and settlement with plaintiff
and the other heirs of the said Virtus F. McConkie,
deceased; that said defendants failed and refused to
restore said property to the heirs of said estate, or to
make any accounting whatsoever and on the contrary at all times since said demand was made upon
them the defendants have asserted that said property
belonged to the defendant J. Archie McConkie in his
own right."
E. The evidence is in~uff1cient to support the
Court's finding No. 13, "That shortly prior to February 14, 1946, the defendant J. Archie McConkie presented to the State Land Board of the State of Utah~
the said forged, altered and mutilated assignments
and affidavits of citizenship and the State of Utah,
without detecting that said instruments had been
forged, altered and mutilated, issued patents to the
real property hereinabove described to the defendant
J. Archie McConkie, which said patents are recurded
in the office of the County Recorder of Uintah County, State of Utah, in Book 33 of Deeds at page 567 and
569 and that, as a result of said recording, said defendant J. Archie McConkie appears to be the record
owner of the said real property.
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F. The evidence is insufficient to support the
Court's finding No. 15, that "The court finds and decides that plaintiff and the other heirs of Virtus F.
1\tlcConkie, deceased, are the ovvners of the property
described in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of these Findings
... and the court now finds that_ plaintiff and the
other heirs of the said Virtus F. McConkie, deceased,
are entitled to such an accounting .... "
G. The evidence is insufficient to support
the Court's finding No. 3 of Findings of Fact on Defendants' Answer, First Defense, wherein the court
found that Plaintiff's action was not barred by the
Statute of Limitations, Sec. 104-2-24 (3), U.C.A.
1943, and that plaintiff did not learn that the real
property was owned by Virtus F. McConkie, nor did
she learn such facts as would put a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence on inquiry until within
three years from the filing of her compl~int.
H. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the
Court's finding No. 1 on Defendants' Second Defense,
vvherein the court found that J. Archie McConkie
is not the owner in fee of the property by virtue of
the patents issued to him by the State of Utah, but
that the Defendant J. Archie McConkie, holds title
to said lands in trust for plaintiff and the other heirs
of Virtus F. McConkie.
I. The evidence is insufficient to sustain finding No.3 on Defendants' Third Defense, wherein it is
found: "It is not true that there was an agreement
between the heirs of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased,
to the effect that the defendants would take over all
of the assets of the estate referred to as the LaPoint
property and pay to the three daughters Pearl McConkie Perry~ Marie McConkie and Leona McConkie~
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the su1n of $2,000 each and, in addition thereto, provide and care for the said Caroline E. McConkie for
the rest of her natural life; in this connection, the
court finds that the said three daughters last mentioned agreed to take the sum of $2,000 each as their
share of the estate of deceased 'vhich had been listed
and set forth in the inventory and appraisment therein filed; that the gross inventory of said listed estate
'vhich did not include the land or water stock described in plaintiff's complaint was $15,040, and onethird of the value thereof belonged to Caroline E.
McConkie, the mother, and the other two-thirds
thereof, namely approximately $10,000 in value, belonged to the five sons and daughters of deceased,
and that one-fifth of said $10,000 valuation equaled
$2,000; and, accordingly, and based upon said specific inventory and listing of the properties of deceased, the plaintiff and her sisters agreed with defendants to accept the sum of $2,000 each in settlement of their distributive portion of said estate; that
each of said daughters was paid the sum of $2,000;
it is not true that the plaintiff objected to this amount
and insisted that she was entitled to a greater sum,
and it is not true that the plaintiff was paid an additional $1,000 by way of distribution from said estate;
and, in this connection, the court finds that the plaintiff received an additional $1,000 from the defendants by way of an insurance settlement on plaintiff's
property, and not otherwise."
J. The evidence does not sustain finding No.
4 of Findings of Fact on Defendants' Third Defense
wherein it found: "The court finds that, when plaintiff and her sisters signed the Assignment set forth
in paragraph 1 above, they signed the same in reliance upon the representation made by Caroline
E. McConkie and the defendants to the effect that
the real property described in paragraphs 6, 7 and
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~ of these Findings on plaintiff's complaint did not
belong to Virtus F. McConkie deceased; that the
agreement with respect to the payment of $2,000 to
the daughters of said deceased covered only the property of said decedent which had been listed in the
inventory and appraisement and was not intended
to affect the property described on plaintiff's complaint; and the court now finds that the plaintiff is
not estopped by reason of accepting said $2,000 from
claiming her interest in the real property which was
omitted from the said inventory and appraisement."

3. Under plaintiff's own evidence she would
not be entitled to the award which the court made,
because J. Archie McConkie and William H. McConkie clearly had an interest in the LaPoint property during the lifetime of the father.
4. Plaintiff's right of action, if one ever existed
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and by laches.
5. Plaintiff waived any interest which she may
have had in the LaPoint property by the assignment
to her mother, to whom any such interest was distributed by the Decree of Distribution which may
not be circumvented by this attack upon it.
6. Plaintiff's suit is a collateral attack upon
the Decree of Distribution in the probate of the estate
of Virtus F. McConkie, which may not be maintained.
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Argument
Points I and II
Plaintiff failed to prove that Virtus F. McConkie owned the
LaPoint property at the time of his death; and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings of the Trial Court.

These two Points lend themselves to a unified
treatment, in that they require a review and discussion of the evidence adduced on the trial of the case.
In order to sustain her position plaintiff must
prove that Virtus F. McConkie was the owner of an
equity in the LaPoint property at the time of his
death; that J. Archie McConkie and William H. McConkie fraudulently altered the assignments thereafter, and wrongfully claimed the property as their
own.
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence as to
ownership of the property by Virtus F. McConkie.
The most which could possibly be said for her proof
would be that the assignments to the property, at one
time stood in the name of Virtus F. McConkie, and
that his name had been erased therefrom and the
name of J. Archie McConkie inserted therein. Her
expert witness in this regard admitted however, that
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a sirnilar situation had occurred in the assignments
prior to the assignment to McConkie (Tr. 63). Thus~
little if any weight can be afforded such an indecisive
bit of evidence.
Yet, from this single shred of evidence as to a
situation which may have existed with respect to the
assignments, everything else which the court found
1nust be inferred. That is, that the substitution of
names was after the father died, that it was fraudulent and to deceive and defraud she and the other
heirs.
She produced no direct evidence of actual ownership by Virtus F. McConkie, and in fact conceded
that she knew that the boys had an interest in the
property (Tr. 34). There is a single isolated hearsay
statement allegedly made to her and attributed to an
uncle to the effect that they hadn't given her all she
was entitled to (Tr. 15, 16). Nor is there anything
particularly to show that the uncle had any special
information . with regards to the situation. Again,
it is interesting to note that the uncle allegedly did
not reveal this information to her for twenty six
years after her father's death, during which time he
apparently harbored it to himself. No explanation
for this odd behavior is inserted into the record, and
bears every evidence of being an afterthought not on
the part of the uncle, but on the part of the plaintiff.
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Nnwhere in the record did anyone testify that
the father O\Yned the property at the time of his
death, that the change in the assignments were made
after the father's death, or even that it was reputed
that the father had some interest in the property.
The plaintiff contends that the defendants have
perpetrated a fraud upon her. This she was obliged to
prove by clear and convincing evidence. Chapman v.
Troy Laundry Co. 87 Utah 15, 47 P. 2d 1054; Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 31, 48 P. 2d 473.
Furthermore, the fraud must be completely
proved. Plaintiff must do more than merely establish a state of facts from which an inference of fraud
may or may not be reasonably drawn. Wilcox v.
West, 45 Cal. App. 2d 267, 114 P. 2d 39. Fraud is
never presumed, but must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. Goff v. Boma Inv. Co. 116
Colo. 359, 181 P. 2d 459; Kurz v. Farmers United Coop. Pool, 199 Okl. 224, 184 P. 2d 790.
The most which plaintiff can possibly be said
to have proved under the most liberal construction
of her evidence, is a suspicion or inference of fraud.
Accordingly, she has failed to establish her case by
clear and convincing evidence.
Nor does it appear here that the statements
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1uaue as to ownership were such representations as
to dissuade the plaintiff from making independent
investigation in line with her belief that her father
had an interest in the LaPoint property. Adamson
v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264.
Not only did she fail utterly to prove fraud by
clear and convincing evidence, but she failed to
establish any of the allegations of her complaint by
evidence which would be sufficient to meet even the
burden of preponderance.
To the contrary, the record clearly establishes
that the father and two sons worked as partners for
a great many years (Tr. 104, 105, 171); that the sons
did not marry until late in life (Tr. 106), and that
consequently all their efforts and resources were directed into the partnership. That the LaPoint property was acquired for the sons, was intended for the
sons (Tr. 114), and was actually channelled to the
sons during the lifetime of the father and with the
full knowledge of all members of the family (Tr.
135, 168, 170, Ex. F); that some 30 years later, after
the boys had worked and struggled to pay for the
property, and to build it into something, and after
they had paid each of the girls $3,000 and supported
the entire family a good part of the time, ( 130, 179,
117) the court without the plaintiff bringing forward
one shred of evidence to sustain her position, relied
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upon hearsay and rumor and inference based apparently upon suspicion, to adjudicate the title to
the property in a manner other than that which the
record has revealed for many years, and cast doubt
upon the probate proceedings.
This record does not sustain the trial court, and
defendants' motion for nonsuit should have been
granted.
FINDING NO. 9

Finding No. 9 is to the effect that the property
and assignments to the LaPoint property were owned
and possessed by Virtus McConkie at the time of his
death. For the reasons heretofore discussed, this finding is not supported by the evidence. To the contrary,
the only evidence in the record is to the effect that
the property had been transferred to J. Archie McConkie during the father's lifetime.
Marie McConkie testified that the title was in
Archie at the time of her father's death and that
she had heard conversations in her father's lifetime
to the effect that the LaPoint property had been
fixed to Archie (Tr. 168, 184).
William McConkie testified to like effect, as did
also Archie (Tr. 135, 247). While William and
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Archie may be held to closer scrutiny, as should be
the plaintiff, because of their interest, it is likewise
abundantly clear that Marie's testimony is entitled
to great weight since it is all against her interests.
She stood to gain equally with the plaintiff in an attack upon the Defendants. However, she not only refused to join in such attack because she knew it to
be unfounded and unwarranted, but also told plaintiff she should be ashamed of herself for making
such an attack which was without merit (Tr. 191).
A reading of her testimony will show the frank candid manner in which she testified even though it was
against her interests to do so. The evidence in the
record is such that it does not support Finding No. 9.
FINDING NO. 10

Finding No. 10 illustrates very graphically the
error into which the court fell in this case. This finding is to the effect that Archie with William's aid
and encouragement fraudulently changed the name
on the assignments as a part of a fraudulent scheme.
There is, however, absolutely no evidence to support
such a finding, and all the evidence is to the contrary. Marie's testimony, William's test i m on y,
Archie's testimony, as well as Exhibit F, which plaintiff introduced, being a part of the answer of J.
Archie McConkie in a previous case, all reveal that
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the changes \Yere 1nade in the lifetime of Virtus F.
lVIcConkie and \Yith his knowledge and consent, anrl
in fact that he \Yas the moving party therein.

FINDING NO. 11

Finding No. 11 that these defendants stated that
they \Yere the owners of the land and the plaintiff
and the other daughters of deceased believed these
statements and relied thereon, and that the statements were false and fraudulent and made with the
intent to deceive the plaintiff and the other heirs of
the estate of Virtus F. McConkie is unique in several
respects. Plaintiff testified that she knew that the
boys had an interest in the LaPoint property (Tr. 34)
thus she could not have been deceived in any event
except as perhaps to the extent of that interest.
Marie not only believed the statements of the
boys as to their ownership, of the property, but testified that she knew all about the transaction by
which the property was obtained and knew it was in
Archie's name and had been fixed to the boys during
'the life of her father. (Tr. 164, 165, 168, 184) In
view of the factual basis upon which her belief was
firmly established;finding No. 11 to the effect that
she, along with the plaintiff was induced to believe
some false statements of the boys that they owned
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the property is little short of amazing. She testified
to the basis for her knowledge that the property belonged to the boys, yet the court says to her in effect:
"You had no such knowledge. You along with your
sister Pearl, the plaintiff in this action, were deceived
by these boys," which is exactly opposite to her
testimony in this case. If anyone was deceived, it
clearly was not Marie, who knew from her mother
and father that the LaPoint property belonged to
the boys.
The mother, another heir, surely could not have
been deceived, since it was she who initially made
the statement that the property in LaPoint belonged
to the boys, and this, even according to the plaintiff's
own testimony. (Tr. 8,22)
It was the mother who assumed the burden,

as administratrix, of determining the estate, and its
contents. It was she who made whatever representations were made in this regard, and the boys
merely joint in these statements. Thus, even assuming evidence (which is entirely nonexistent) that
the boys mislead plaintiff by these statements, still,
the prime actor in the alleged fraud must necessarily
have been the mother. Yet, no'Yhere does plaintiff
accuse her mother of deceiving her by the statements. Thus we have the unique situation of the
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pated in the staternents to the daughter which allegedly mislead her, is also found by the court to
have been mislead, and one of the daughters who testified that she \vas not mislead by the statements
because she had independent information that the
statements were correct, also becoming the defrauded
parties along with the plaintiff.
FINDING NO. 12

Finding No. 12 is to the effect that the plaintiff~
until April 9, 1949 believed the property belonged
to the boys and only after that date made a discovery
to the contrary and 'that the assignments had been
fraudulently altered.
Plaintiff did testify that it was in 1949 that she
discovered that the assignments were altered, and
that prior to that, she believed the property to have
been owned by her brothers. However, this testimony so conflicts with her other testimony and
the facts as they exist, that it is obvious that this
finding cannot be sustained.
Plaintiff says that she knew her folks had an
interest in the LaPoint property prior to the time
they met in O'Donnell's office, although she claims
to have known nothing as to the details, (Tr. 30) and
that she thought the LaPoint property was in her
father's name (Tr. 38).
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She lived next door to her parents during her
father's lifetime and lived with her mother, sisters
and brothers after her divorce, as a member of the
family (Tr. 25). Her sister, living under the same
circumstances was aware of the transactions and
knew all that was going on and knew that in the
father's lifetime he had arranged for the land to go
to Archie and William (Tr. 164, 165, 168, 184).
If plaintiff knew as she says she did that her

folks had an interest in the land and yet that interest
didn't appear in the properties specifically described
in the probate, surely this was reason to put her on
notice that she should make inquiry, and she would
be bound by what she discovered or should hav~
discovered. Of this more will be said under Point IV.
The point advanced at this time is that the evidence is clear that she knew what the whole situation
was, that she knew the LaPoint property belonged to
the boys and could not have been deaf and blind to
these very apparent facts and that this is the reason
that she let the matter lie dormant for 30 years.
Observe, also, that the plaintiff in order to fix a conversation which she had with her sister Marie with
respect to the LaPoint property tied that conversation
to a registered letter which she had written to
Archie in February of 1947, (Tr. 206) and which
involved a claim as to the LaPoint property. She
also testified that she had a conversation with Wilf
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lVIcConkie (the uncle) when certain information pertaining to the property was revealed to her, and that
this ,,·as in the Spring of 1948 ( Tr. 15, 65) . In seeking to explain certain statements she had made in
her deposition "·hich indicated that she knew that
her father had turned in certain land and certain
cattle on the LaPoint property, she qualified her
statements by saying that she learned these facts in
1949. (Tr. 35, 36). Also in evidence is paragraph
11 of plaintiff's complaint in a previous suit in which
she alleged: "That the said lands or equities thereon
of said Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, were never
included in the probate for the purpose of escaping
inheritance tax due the State of Utah, and that it had
been agreed by oral agreement between the heirs
that the lands would be divided equally between the
heirs of the decedent, Virtus F. McConkie, as provided
by law."
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted, that Finding No. 12 cannot be supported
under the evidence.
FINDING NO. 13

Finding No. 13 is perhaps not detrimental to
the defendants except that it repeats the unfounded
charges of forgery, but has exactly nothing in the
record to support it. Whether the State of Utah may
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or Inay not have detected alteration does not appear
from this record, and certainly it does definitely
appear that there were other alterations of the assignments than the ones here involved.
FINDING NO. 15

Finding No. 15 represents a culmination of the
other findings hereinabove discussed in that it finds
that the plaintiff and other heirs are owners of the
LaPoint property and are entitled to an accounting.
This finding has equally little support in the
record. The only evidence in the record is, as has
been repeated heretofore, that the property was
fixed to the boys in the father's lifetime at his request and in his presence; that it had been purchased
for this purpose, and that all of the interested parties
were aware of the fact at all times prior to the
father's death.
The finding is also subject to the defect that it
appears to be a collateral attempt at adjudication of
a title to property which passed under the Decree of
Distribution as will more fully appear under point
VI herein.
The trial of the case was commenced November
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der advisement the defendants' motion for nonsuit.
On January +, 1951 the Court concluded that there
was sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Trial
was resumed June 4, 1951, and the court rendered a
Memorandum Decision July 20, 1951 and the findings were filed in December of 1951. Thus, a considerable time intervened in the trial of the case.
Sufficient time, in fact, that the evidence or lack
thereof may have become confused by the court with
the allegations of the complaint which is much more
comprehensive than was the proof which the plaintiff offered.
Whatever the reason for the erroneous findings,.
however, the defendants earnestly submit that the
evidence fails to sustain the findings of the trial court,
and that for this reason the case should be reversed.

*

* * * *

Findings on Defendants' First, Second
and Third Defenses
FINDING NO. 3, DEFENDANTS' FIRST DEFENSE

In this finding the court finds that plaintiff was
not barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
evidence on this matter is treated separately at Point
IV.
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FINDING NO. 1, DEfENDANTS' SECOND DEFENSE

This is a finding against ownership by J. Archie
McConkie, and the evidence supporting this ownership is fully developed in the discussed under Findings No. 9, 10, 11, 12, and 15.
FINDING NO. 3, DEFENDANTS' THIRD DEFENSE

This findings is to the effect that the sisters
agreed to accept $2,000 each in settlement of their
distribution share of the father's estate as it was listed
and specifically described in the probate proceedings.
The court apparently proceeds in this finding upon
the theory that the estate was distributed to the
mother and the assignments of the childrens' interests to the mother pursuant to the agreement that the
boys were to take over the property. Such a theory
cannot be sustained under the evidence.
The only evidence with respect to the agreement on the part of the boys to take over the property
and pay the girls $2,000 each is to the effect that
quite some time after the estate had been closed and
the property distributed, to the mother, she made the
proposition to the boys that if they would pay the
girls $2,000 each and would take care of her in her
lifetime, then she would convey her estate to them.
Even the plaintiff with all her claims, did not offer
any testimony which would in any way indicate that
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these parties had n1ade an agree1nent before thf
assignment to their n1other, that the boys were to
take over the property. Her testimony was that the
mother had agreed to take the property and divide it,
and that she asked her mother for the money and
'vas informed that the boys would have to pay her.
(Tr. 44). It is obvious, therefore that there was no
agreement amongst the family members prior to the
decree of distribution in probate, that the boys would
take over the property and pay the girls therefore, yet
this finding along with the others seems to tie the
agreement to the specific property and specific transaction.
FINDING NO. 4, DEFENDANTS' THIRD DEFENSE

This finding is to the effect that plaintiff and her
sisters relied upon the representations that defendants' owned the LaPoint property and signed the release in reliance thereon and also that the $2,000 paid
to each of the girls was only as to the property listed
specifically in the inventory and appraisement, or in
other words, the Maeser property.
As pointed out in the discussion under Finding
No. 9 and 11, Marie testified that she did not rely
upon such representations, because she had independent knowledge that the facts were as stated at
that time. Thus, this finding is not sustainable in
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this respect, and as pointed out a hove with reference
to Finding No. 3, Defendants' Third Defense, the
$2,000 had nothing to do with the assignments to the
mother, but was an independent transaction which
arose after the termination of the probate.
It is respectfull ysubmitted that the Findings on

Defendants' First, Second and Third Defense are not
sustained by the evidence.

Point Ill
Under Plaintiff's own evidence she would not be entitled to
the award which the court made, because J. Archie McConkie and
William H. McConkie clearly had an interest in the LaPoint property during the lifetime of the father.

Plaintiff admitted knowledge that Archie and
William had an interest in the LaPoint property
(Tr. 34). Having admitted knowledge of such an
interest, the question then is what was the extent
of that interest. In this we look to the evidence
which establishes that for many years prior to the
father's death, he and his two sons, Archie and
William had been partners in the ranching and cattle
raising business. ( Tr. 104, 105, 171 ) . This evidence
stands completely uncontradicted, and undisputed
and the Court was not at liberty to disregard it~
Parker v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 68 Utah 472, 251
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P. 11; Harness v. Ind. Con1m., 81 Utah 276, 17 P.
2d ']. 7 7; Hynes v. vVhite +7 Cal. app. 5+9, 190 P. 838;
20 ~-\m. Jur. 1030 Evidence Section 1180. Therefore~
in any event, they had at least partnership interests
in the property, and the court erred in failing to
determine the extent of the partnership interest, or
in excluding the partnership interest from the duty
to account, and erred in finding contrary to plaintiff's o\'vn evidence, that the boys had no interest in
the property except as heirs.
*

*

*

*

*

Defendants feel that the evidence fails to sustain
plaintiff in making out a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentations to her and the other heirs,
and that accordingly the court erred in not granting
defendants' motion for nonsuit; that the court erred
in its findings in the respects heretofore noted, in
that the evidence does not sustain such findings.
However, it appears to defendants that even assuining that the court was correct in determining that
the father owned or had an interest or equity in the
LaPoint property at the time of his death, that still
the plaintiff is not and was not entitled to prevail in
this action. Accordingly, the following points and
arguments assume (for the purpose of argumen1
only) the father's interest in the property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
Point IV
Plaintiff's right of action, if one ever existed is barred by the
Statute of Limitations.

Section 104-2-22 ( 1) U .C.A. 1943 establishes the
limitation for an action for the mesne profits of real
property to be six years. Section 104-2-24 (3) U.C.A.
1943 fixes the period of limitations for relief from
fraud or 1nistake to be three years from the time of
the discovery of the fraud.
The plaintiff very carefully attempted to keep
her action from being barred by this latter section,
by testimony that she learned nothing of her right
of action until just prior to the commencement of her
action. However, the principle is well established
that whatever is notice to excite attention, and put
a party on his guard and call for inquiry, is notice
of everything to which such inquiry would have
lead. The Statute of Limitations begins to run from
the discovery of the fraud or discovery of such facts
as would put a person of ordinary intelligence on
notice. Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426;
Larson v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 23 Utah 457,
65 P. 208; Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish -Fork South Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153
P. 2d 547.
The plaintiff's testimony in this case shows that
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she was concerned about the property, and asked
about it having a question in her mind concerning
it at the tin1e of the 1neeting in O'Donnell's office.
(Tr. 30). She knew of the existence of the property,
(Tr. 30) she kne'\lv her folks had an interest in it,
(Tr. 30), and she thought it was in her father's
name (Tr. 38). She lived with the defendants and
her mother and sisters for a considerable period of
time froin 1920 to 1924 (Tr. 25), and could scarcely
have been unaware of the conversations and discussions which took place concerning the property.
vVhatever investigation she made in 1949, which
revealed, according to her theory (although not according to the evidence), that her father owned the
property, \Yould have been as easily discoverable at
that time.
It does not appear that she troubled herself to
1nake any further inquiry of the mother and the
brothers at the time of the meeting in O'Donnell's
office, although the perfectly natural thing to do
under such circumstances would have been to voice
her inquiry as to how come the LaPoint property
belonged to the boys when she thought her father
had an interest in it, and thought it was in his name.
The ideal time to have cleared up these questions
would have been prior to signing the assignment,
and at a time when any search she might have made
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would have been rewarded by immediate answers.
Plaintiff also testified that she knew her father
turned some cattle and made some payments on the
property in question by turning in land on it CTr. 35).
True, she qualified this statement from her deposi-·
tion, by explanation that she learned these facts at
a later date. However, inquiry at the time the question arose in her mind, would have revealed these
facts to her in 1920 if they were true. Her statement
from her pleadings in the previous action (Tr. 215),
which we have heretofore quoted under point II,
indicates a purpose for not including the land in the
estate which is inconsistent with lack of knowledge
of the interest which her father had in it.
It is submitted that the foregoing evidence es-

tablishes that the plaintiff Pither knew, or in the ex·
ercise of her faculties as a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, she was put on notice by the
probate proceedings and should have made inquiry
and could have discovered the full facts as she alleges
them to be, assuming the existence of such facts
and that therefor~, she is barred by the Statute of
Limitations, many times over,
It is further submitted, that the evidence of

Marie McConkie Johnson and Verdin Johnson, two
witnesses whose interests were counter to their testi-
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n1ony, standing as it does, is conclusive that Pearl
McConkie Perry had full knowledge of the existence
of the LaPoint property and the situation surrounding it at least as far back as 1927 and 1946, and
further substantiate the fact that Plaintiff is barred
by the Statute of Limitations and by Laches front
asserting any rights which might exist.
Point V
Plaintiff waived any interest which she may have had in the
LaPoint property by the assignment to her mother, to whom any
such interest was distributed by the Decree of Distribution which
may not be circumvented by this attack upon it.

If the father had an interest in the LaPoint property, then it was disposed of in the probate of that
Estate by the Decree of Distribution, and passed to
the mother Caroline E. McConkie, and this regardless of whether or not a fraud was perpetrated upon
the plaintiff whereby such a thing was made possible. This is illustrated as follows:

The children assigned all of their interest in the
Estate to their mother. If the LaPoint property was
a part of the father's estate, then it was assigned.
The "omnibus" clause in the Decree of Distribution
then passed title to this property to Caroline E. McConkie, and there can be no question but that this
is the exact effect of the Decree of Distribution.
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The rule is stated in 4 Bancroft, Probate Practise, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1144, to be that:
" It is customary to conclude the decree
with an "omnibus" clause to guard against
omissions and failures in specific description.
Under such a clause the whole of the residue~
whether described or undescribed, known or
unknown, may be distributed. . . ."
In Smith v. Biscailuz, 83 Cal. 344, 21 P. 15, certain real property was not mentioned in the probate
of the estate other than the fact that the decree of
distribution contained an "omnibus" clause. It was
held that the decree passed title to the property not
mentioned which belonged to the decedent.
Similarly, in the case In re Bouche's Estate 24
Cal. App. 2d 86, 74 P. 2d 563, where property
was involved which had not been included specifically in the probate decree, but the decree contained
an omnibus clause. The trial court in that case upon
petition allowed the estate to be re-opened to administer newly discovered assets. On appeal the
court held, however, that there was no need to reopen to administer such assets, because they passed
under the original decree, and reversed the trial
court. Said the court:
"In the case at bar the decree of distribution adequately provided as hereinbefore
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noted, for the distribution of "any other property belonging to said estate, whether described herein or not, as "Tell as for the distribution of the rest, residue, and remainder of
said estate." This provision vested in the
trustees \Yhatever estate the contract in question created. (citing Humphry v. Protestant,
etc., Church 154 Cal. 170, 97 P. 187; Victoria
Hosp. Ass'n v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 147
P. 124) ... "
In Humphry v. Protestant etc., Church, 154 Cal.
170, 97 P. 187; and Victoria Hosp. Ass'n v. All Persons etc., 169 Cal. 455, 147 P. 124, the same rule is
followed.
Utah has recognized this rule in the recent case
of Jones v. Cook, (Utah) 223 P. 2d 423: wherein the
effect of such an omnibus clause was stated to be:
"The phrase 'any and all other property
not now known or discovered which may belong to said estate or in which said estate may
have an interest,' covers any property not specifically described which was owned by decedent and not disposed of in the regular course
of probate."
Thus, if plaintiff is correct in her assertion that
the LaPoint property should have been included in
the estate, and if she proves that it was a part of the
estate, she also proves that it passed to the mother
under the Decree of Distribution.
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It follows therefore, that she must make a direct
attack upon that decree rather than a collateral
attack, and that she must vacate the decree of distribution on the ground of fraud, and that otherwise the
decree distributing the property to the mother, is
presumptively valid.
Nowhere does the plaintiff charge her mother
with having fraudulently failed to include the LaPoint property in the estate whereby she was induced
to sign the assignment which had the effect of allowing the property to be conveyed in probate to the
mother. Yet, necessarily, this must be charged and
proved under any theory upon which the plaintiff
might elect to proceed. Mrs. Caroline E. McConkie
by all the testimony, including that of the plaintiff
told all parties concerned at the time the assignment
was made to her that the boys owned the LaPoint
property. This being so, plaintiff must charge and
prove that the mother defrauded her of her rights,
if, as she insists, the father had some interest in the
LaPoint property at the time of his death.
However, at no point does she make such an
accusation against her mother to whom the property
passed if it was a part of the estate. Her complaint
is that the boys got the property which is a part of
the estate. If it was a part of the estate, then the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
boys acquired it from the mother by her deed to
them, and again the plaintiff must charge that the
mother obtained the property from her by fraud.
In this she would be in the unique position of being
the only heir who would claim her mother perpetrated a fraud, \Vith her sister who would have
equally as much to gain by such an accusation maintaining stoutly that there was absolutely no fraud
involved.
Point VI
Plaintiff's suit is a collateral attack upon the Decree of Distribution in the Probate of the Estate of Virtus F. McConkie, which
may not be maintained against these defendants.

1 Bancroft Probate Practice, 2nd Ed. Sec. 81,
282, 130 P. 217, wherein it was stated:
"The general rule is now well established
that a judgment, order, or decree of a probate
court ... is equally as immune from collateral
attack as is the judgment of any other court
whatsoever., acting within the scope of its
state the rule to be:
That a decree may not be attack collaterally is
established in Utah by the case In re Evans, 42 Utah
jurisdiction. . ."
"The law is well settled that a decree of
distribution in probate proceedings, after due
and legal notice, by a court having jurisdiction
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of the subject matter is conclusive as to the
fund, items, and matters covered by and properly included within the decree until set
aside or modified by the court entering the
decree in the manner prescribed by law~ or
until reversed on appeal."
That the attack in this case is collateral is clearly
established by Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P.
3d 1S7. In that case, this court held that a "direct
attack" was an attempt to correct or avoid the judgnlent in some manner provided by law. That it is
an attack by appropriate proceedings between the
parties thereto, seeking to have the judgment annulled, reversed, vacated, or declared void. Conversely, when the direct purpose and aim of the proceeding is to attain relief other than setting aside or
modifying the judgment and the attack upon the
judgment is merely incidental, then the attack is
collateral.
Tested by these standards, it is obvious that the
attack in this case is collateral. The avowed purpose
of the suit was to require the defendants to hold the
property in trust for the heirs of Virtus F. McConkie,
and for an accounting.
It is obvious that the paramount purpose here

was not to vacate the decree for cause, since the plaintiff did not, in her pleadings at any point charge the
administratrix with having defrauded her. Yet, this
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would have been ~bsolutely essential to a suit to vacate the decree, since the misrepresentation was one
made by the administratrix, the Decree of Distribution passed the property to the Administratrix, and
anything \vhich she may have elected to do with the
property thereafter was something which she should
be held accountable for.
Thus, if plaintiff's proof is correct, then her
mode of procedure is wrong, and she is proceeding
against the wrong parties.
So long as the decree in probate stands, it is the
rights of the parties, which means that the plaintiff
has no interest in any of her father's estate, she
having assigned her interests, and the Decree of Distribution having distributed that estate to her mother.
She has not vacated the decree, and is bound by it.
This property, if it was a part of the father's
estate, passed to the mother under the probate. She,
and she alone was answerable to the plaintiff for any
misrepresentation, because it was she who received
the property by virtue of the claimed misrepresentation. It is respectfully submitted, that the trial court
had no authority whatsoever, under the circumstances to find against the defendants and require
them to account, and that the decree in probate standing as it does, precludes such a proceeding as here
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bro~ght

and adjudicated .by the trial court. The
adjudication in this case constitutes an impeachment
of, and contradiction of the decree of Distribution yet
that decree stands unvacated.

*

*

*

*

*

CONCLUSION

The Defendants respectfully submit that the
trial court committed the following fundamental
errors in the trial and disposition of this case.
1. The trial should have granted defendants'
motion for dismissal or nonsuit because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facia case.
2. The great proponderance of the evidence indicates that the property here involved did not belong to the deceased, and that it did belong to J.
Archie McConkie, and that there was and is no fraud
involved, and that plaintiff failed to establish her
case.
3. That even assuming an interest in the estate,
and assuming her right to reach it in these proceedings, the court erred in ruling that the entire LaPoint
property was included in the estate, under the evidence that the father, and the two sons were co-partners.
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4. That plaintiff is barred by the Statute of
Limitations and by laches from asserting her claimed
rights.
5. That plaintiff's rights if any she had passed
by virtue of the assignment to her mother and the
Decree of Distribution.
6. That plaintiff without directly attacking the
decree and establishing that she was defrauded by
her mother into assigning her property rights to her
mother, thus enabling the mother to get a distribution of the property of the estate to her, may not
proceed against these defendants in derrogation of
the Decree of Distribution.
Respectfully submitted,

COLTON AND HAMMOND
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD

Attorneys for Appellants.
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